Peace of Westphalia

The term Peace of Westphalia refers to the two peace treaties of Osnabrück and Münster, signed on May 15 and October 24 of 1648 respectively, which ended both the Thirty Years' War in Germany and the Eighty Years' War between Spain and the Netherlands. The treaties involved the Holy Roman Emperor, Ferdinand III (Habsburg), the Kingdoms of Spain, France and Sweden, the Dutch Republic and their respective allies among the princes of the Holy Roman Empire.

The Peace of Westphalia resulted from the first modern diplomatic congress and initiated a new order in central Europe based on the concept of national sovereignty. Until 1806, the regulations became part of the constitutional laws of the Holy Roman Empire. The Treaty of the Pyrenees, signed in 1659, ended the war between France and Spain and is often considered part of the overall accord.

[edit] Locations
The peace negotiations were held in the cities of Münster and Osnabrück because Protestant and Catholic leaders refused to meet. The Catholics used Münster, while the Protestants used Osnabrück.


[edit] Delegations
The French delegation was headed by Henri II d'Orléans, duc de Longueville and further comprised the diplomats Claude d'Avaux and Abel Servien. The Swedes plenipotentiaries sent Johan Oxenstierna, the son of chancellor Axel Oxenstierna, and Johann Adler Salvius. The head of the delegation of the Holy Roman Empire for both cities was Count Maximilian von Trautmansdorff; in Münster, his aides were Johann Ludwig von Nassau-Hadamar and Isaak Volmar (a lawyer); in Osnabrück, his team comprised Johann Maximilian von Lamberg and Reichshofrat Johann Krane, a lawyer. The Spanish delegation was headed by Gaspar de Bracamonte y Guzmán. The nuntius of Cologne, Fabio Chigi, and the Venetian envoy Alvise Contarini acted as mediators. Various Imperial States of the Holy Roman Empire also sent delegations. The Republic of the Seven United Netherlands sent a delegation of eight, and Johann Rudolf Wettstein, the mayor of Basel, represented the Old Swiss Confederacy.

Internal political boundaries

The power taken by Ferdinand III in contravention of the Holy Roman Empire's constitution was stripped and returned to the rulers of the German states. This rectification allowed the rulers of the German states to independently decide their religious worship. [See cuius regio, eius religio, below] Protestants and Catholics were redefined as equal before the law, and Calvinism was given legal recognition. [1] [2]


[edit] Tenets
The main tenets of the Peace of Westphalia were:

All parties would now recognize the Peace of Augsburg of 1555, by which each prince would have the right to determine the religion of his own state, the options being Catholicism, Lutheranism, and now Calvinism (the principle of cuius regio, eius religio). [1] [2]
Christians living in principalities where their denomination was not the established church were guaranteed the right to practice their faith in public during allotted hours and in private at their will. [1]

There is no getting away By Kamran Shafi

THAILAND is one of the most pleasurable places in the whole wide world to visit — now before any of you start sniggering, I am here with my twelve-year-old daughter, so there — everybody smiles at you, the food is great, the shopping affordable, and even the weather is cooler than that in the Land of the Pure at this time of year.

If you are travelling Thai Airlines, the feeling that you are in friendly and caring hands washes over you the moment you step on to the airplane. The attendants are exceedingly polite and helpful and nobody growls at you as they most times do on PIA, the exception being a good PIA flight now and again.

Our hotel in Siam Square, the Novotel, a 4-star establishment (it is at least 7-star when compared to most of the kitsch hostelries in the Fatherland almost all of which are actually shadi-ghars or marriage halls now), is a great hotel with excellent services. It is located right by the best eating places, cinemas, and spanking new shopping malls and department stores.

The comfortable and squeaky clean Sky-Train is a one-minute walk away and once on it you have the freedom of the city of Bangkok where one of the most helpful and hospitable and delightful people that I know, Prapa Smutkojon, lives. What a pleasure it is being with him and discussing the world with him.

But by God was it difficult to get a tourist visa to visit this great and gentle Kingdom this time around! I have been here tens of times (the first time in 1979), and there were at least three previous visas, one as recent as February this year, in the passport presented to the embassy, but what a palaver it was to get one. It was so difficult and embarrassing and demeaning that had it not been for Zainab whose holiday this was, I would have withdrawn my passport and not come at all.

And what was the problem after completing ALL the formalities such as attaching bank statements and air tickets (as if we might have swum to Thailand otherwise!), attaching a letter introducing myself AND naming Prapa as my contact in Bangkok complete with his address and telephone numbers? That since I had written in the column ‘Profession’ the word ‘Columnist’, there was not a letter from my editor saying that I was, indeed, a columnist with his newspaper!

I thought the Thai embassy had a press section that actually scanned the Pakistani papers! And who might have known that there was a columnist called Kamran Shafi in the English press in Pakistan who had been writing for not one or two or three years, but for 25! I mean, puhlease!

It was not as if I had asked the Thai embassy to pay my airfare, or my hotel expenses, that my editor’s certificate was necessary. I mean all I was doing was applying for a tourist visa so I could bring my little daughter to this beautiful country for a short holiday. That is all.

But wait. When I told Prapa about my tribulations at the hands of the Thai embassy in Islamabad, he told me of his friend’s at the hands of our embassy in Bangkok. Apparently some typically typical bureaucrat, and by golly do we have more than our fair share of them, had asked for a ‘FAXED’ copy of something or other document.

When Prapa and his friend went with an ‘EMAILED’ copy of the document, the Pakistani bureaucrat rejected it, insisting on a ‘FAX’. So, there it is, tit for bloody tat! One bureaucrat outdoing another. But, seriously, Thailand is a far better run, better organised country than the Citadel of Islam in every single way. Why, even the electricity doesn’t go off, not for a single minute, ever.

Its visa procedures, therefore, need to be made more efficient too. The Thai embassy in Islamabad is the only embassy that has asked me for a letter from my editor. And I travel rather a lot.Elsewhere now and there are reports that the Americans are ‘winning’ in Iraq. One million or so killed and maimed-for-life Iraqis; fully 15 per cent of the country’s population refugees; several trillion $s down the tube; Iraq’s infrastructure in ruins; the Turks bombing the daylights out of the Kurds; and America with many more enemies than before the assault on Iraq is winning, is it?

If it is, then why not an all-out assault on Afghanistan and Pakistan’s tribal areas? Indeed, why not nuke ’em out of existence? It will cost less and if there are no more Afghans and Pakistani tribals there will not be any problem, what?

Meanwhile, news from home is, as usual, bad and bad news follows you wherever you go, even in beautiful Thailand. The latest shenanigans of Rehman Malik aka The One Man Wrecking Crew and the evidently not-very-bright Yousuf Raza Gilani have delivered another kick in the nation’s teeth, sending it reeling another time.

I am no friend of a rampant ISI, let me say straight away, but to place it under an unelected person, particularly one whose name is Rehman Malik who has already distinguished himself not once, not twice, but three times putting both his feet in the government’s collective mouth?

Instead of trying to cut the ISI to size in several other ways, one being posting out the incumbent directors general, all of them, and reducing the ranks of their successors, these nincompoops go and issue a silly order as if Musharraf and his handmaidens who still hold positions of great authority would let them get away with it.

NOW does Zardari understand just WHY it was/is imperative that the Commando be got rid off at the earliest opportunity? NOW does he understand that the judges should have been restored to the pre-Nov 3 position months ago? NOW does he understand that Naek, Khosa, Awan and Company were/are exactly the wrong people to listen to?

I am still plumping for democracy; I am still hopeful that we will transform from an army-dominated dictatorship to a true democracy; I am still hopeful that the great coalition will stay and prosper. But will Asif Zardari do the right thing, even now? If he doesn’t it is his neck first on the block — he should know that much.

PS. More good news: Thailand beat Pakistan 29-0 in the Under-15 Asian School Football Championships in Bangkok this last Saturday. However, we are a nuclear power and have not one, but several bums.

kshafi1@yahoo.co.uk

Source: www.Dawn.com

Blue Planet in Green Shackles

The Competitive Enterprise Institute is proud to announce a provocative new book on environmental policy, Blue Planet in Green Shackles by Václav Klaus, President of the Czech Republic.President Klaus makes the case that policies being proposed to address global warming are not justified by current science and are, in fact, a dangerous threat to freedom and prosperity around the world.

Klaus argues that the environmental movement has transformed itself into an ideology that seeks to restrict human activities at any cost, while pursuing an impossible utopian dream of a perfectly "natural" world. The supposed threat of human civilization against a fragile Earth has become an article of faith, especially in the realm of global warming activism.

"The largest threat to freedom, democracy, the market economy, and prosperity at the end of the 20th and at the beginning of the 21st century is no longer socialism," writes Klaus. "It is, instead, the ambitious, arrogant, unscrupulous ideology of environmentalism."

The publication of Blue Planet in Green Shackles: What is Endangered: Climate or Freedom? continues the Competitive Enterprise Institute's history of fighting alarmist climate policies. CEI has long argued that whatever challenges future climate changes might bring, the worst possible response is to restrict human freedom and slow economic growth and innovation.

"Today, the global warming debate raging in both the United States and Europe has become extremely contentious. On both sides of the Atlantic, the debate has metastasized into cultural warfare against economic liberty," writes CEI President Fred L. Smith, Jr. in the book's foreword. "For that reason, pro-freedom voices are needed to reframe the debate to show how a free people can better address the challenges facing Western civilization. To that end, we are proud to publish Blue Planet in Green Shackles."


Source: http://www.globalwarming.org/

Vietnam War

The Vietnam War, also known as the Second Indochina War, or the Vietnam Conflict, occurred from 1959[9] to April 30, 1975. The war was fought between the communist Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), supported by its communist allies, and the US-supported Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam).[10][11]

The Vietcong, the lightly-armed South Vietnamese communist insurgency, largely fought a guerilla war against anti-communist forces in the region. The North Vietnamese Army engaged in a more conventional war, at times committing large-sized units into battle. U.S. and South Vietnamese forces relied on air superiority and overwhelming firepower to conduct search-and-destroy operations, involving ground forces, artillery and air strikes. The United States and South Vietnam also conducted clandestine operations throughout the war using special operations units and Central Intelligence Agency operatives.

The United States entered the war to prevent a communist takeover of South Vietnam (as part of a wider strategy of containment during the Cold War), beginning with military advisory missions in the early 1960s and escalating to full warfare with the deployment of combat units from 1965 onward. By 1973, almost all U.S. troops had left the theater and in 1975, communist forces assumed control of South Vietnam. North and South Vietnam were reunified shortly thereafter.

The war, and the failure of the United States to achieve its objective, had a major impact on U.S. politics, culture and foreign relations. Americans were deeply divided over the U.S. government’s justification for, and conduct of the war. Opposition to the war formed the basis for the counterculture youth movement of the 1960s.

The war exacted a huge human cost as well. In addition to approximately 58,000 U.S. soldiers killed, 3 to 4 million Vietnamese from both sides, and 1.5 to 2 million Laotians and Cambodians lost their lives.[12]

United States goes to war, 1963–1969

Lyndon Johnson, as he took over the presidency after the death of Kennedy, did not consider Vietnam a priority and was more concerned with his "Great Society" and progressive social programs.[64] Johnson had a difficult time with American foreign policy makers, specifically Averill Harriman and Dean Acheson, who to Johnson's mind spoke a different language.[65] Particularly heated was the relationship between the new president and national security advisor McGeorge Bundy. Shortly after the assassination of Kennedy, when Bundy called LBJ on the phone, LBJ responded:

"Goddammit, Bundy. I've told you that when I want you I'll call you."[66]

On November 24, 1963, Johnson brought a small group together to talk with Henry Cabot Lodge, and the new president provided his support to help win the Vietnam war.[67] But the pledge came at a time when Vietnam was deteriorating, especially in places like the Mekong Delta, because of the recent coup against Diem.[68]

The military revolutionary council, meeting in lieu of a strong South Vietnamese leader, was made up of 12 members headed by General Minh—whom Stanley Karnow, a journalist on the ground, later recalled as "a model of lethargy."[69] His regime was overthrown in January 1964 by General Nguyen Khanh. Lodge, frustrated by the end of year, cabled home about Minh: "Will he be strong enough to get on top of things?"[70]

On August 2, 1964, the USS Maddox, on an intelligence mission along North Vietnam's coast, fired upon and damaged several torpedo boats that had been stalking it in the Gulf of Tonkin.[71] A second attack was reported two days later on the USS Turner Joy and Maddox in the same area. The circumstances of the attack were murky. Lyndon Johnson commented to Undersecretary of State George Ball that "those sailors out there may have been shooting at flying fish."[72] The second attack led to retaliatory air strikes, prompted Congress to approve the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, and gave the president power to conduct military operations in Southeast Asia without declaring war. In the same month, Johnson pledged that he was not "...committing American boys to fighting a war that I think ought to be fought by the boys of Asia to help protect their own land."[73]

In 2005, however, an NSA declassified report[71] revealed that there was no attack on 4 August. It had already been called into question long before this. "The Gulf of Tonkin incident," writes Louise Gerdes, "is an oft-cited example of the way in which Johnson misled the American people to gain support for his foreign policy in Vietnam."[74] George C. Herring argues, however, that McNamara and the Pentagon "did not knowingly lie about the alleged attacks, but they were obviously in a mood to retaliate and they seem to have selected from the evidence available to them those parts that confirmed what they wanted to believe."[75] Rising from 5,000 in 1959, there were now 100,000 guerrilla fighters in 1964.[59] Some have argued that ten soldiers are needed to deal with every one insurgent.[59] Thus, the total number of U.S. troops in 1964 needed to defeat the insurgents may have exceeded the entire strength of the United States Army.[59]

The National Security Council recommended a three-stage escalation of the bombing of North Vietnam. On March 2, 1965, following an attack on a U.S. Marine barracks at Pleiku, Operation Flaming Dart and Operation Rolling Thunder commenced. The bombing campaign, which ultimately lasted three years, was intended to force North Vietnam to cease its support for the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF) by threatening to destroy North Vietnam's air defenses and industrial infrastructure. As well, it was aimed at bolstering the morale of the South Vietnamese.[76] Between March 1965 and November 1968, "Rolling Thunder" deluged the north with a million tons of missiles, rockets and bombs.[77] Bombing was not restricted to North Vietnam. Other aerial campaigns, such as Operation Commando Hunt, targeted different parts of the NLF and Vietnam People's Army (VPA) infrastructure. These included the Ho Chi Minh Trail, which ran through Laos and Cambodia. The objective of forcing North Vietnam to stop its support for the NLF, however, was never reached. As one officer noted "this is a political war and it calls for discriminate killing. The best weapon … would be a knife … The worst is an airplane."[78] The Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force Curtis LeMay, however, had long advocated saturation bombing in Vietnam and wrote of the Communists that "we're going to bomb them back into the Stone Age".[79]

Escalation and ground war

Escalation of the Vietnam War officially started on the morning of January 31, 1965, when orders were cut and issued to mobilize the 18th TAC Fighter Squadron from Okinawa to Danang air force base (AFB). A red alert alarm to scramble was sounded at Kadena AFB at 3:00 a.m. F-105s, pilots, and support were deployed from Okinawa and landed in Vietnam that afternoon to join up with other smaller units who had already arrived weeks earlier. Preparations were under way for the first step of Operation Flaming Dart. The mission of Operation Flaming Dart, to cross the Seventeenth Parallel into North Vietnam, had already been planned and was in place before the NLF attack on Pleiku airbase on February 6. On February 7, forty-nine F-105 Thunderchiefs flew out of Danang AFB to targets located in North Vietnam. From this day forward the war was no longer confined to South Vietnam. It took almost an hour to get all forty nine of the F-105's in the air. On that morning, the continuous loud roar of the F-105 engines going down the runway, one following another, was described by the ground crew as a "rolling thunder". At this time the Marines had not landed and Danang AFB was unprotected.[citation needed]

After several attacks upon them, it was decided that U.S. Air Force bases needed more protection. The South Vietnamese military seemed incapable of providing security. On March 8, 1965, 3,500 United States Marines were dispatched to South Vietnam. This marked the beginning of the American ground war. U.S. public opinion overwhelmingly supported the deployment.[80] Public opinion, however, was based on the premise that Vietnam was part of a global struggle against communism. In a statement similar to that made to the French almost two decades earlier, Ho Chi Minh warned that if the Americans "want to make war for twenty years then we shall make war for twenty years. If they want to make peace, we shall make peace and invite them to afternoon tea."[81] As former First Deputy Foreign Minister Tran Quang Co has noted, the primary goal of the war was to reunify Vietnam and secure its independence. The policy of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) was not to topple other non-communist governments in South East Asia.[82]

The Marines' assignment was defensive. The initial deployment of 3,500 in March was increased to nearly 200,000 by December.[83] The U.S. military had long been schooled in offensive warfare. Regardless of political policies, U.S. commanders were institutionally and psychologically unsuited to a defensive mission.[83] In May, Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) forces suffered heavy losses at the Battle of Binh Gia. They were again defeated in June, at the Battle of Dong Xoai. Desertion rates were increasing, and morale plummeted. General William Westmoreland informed Admiral Grant Sharp, commander of U.S. Pacific forces, that the situation was critical.[83] He said, "I am convinced that U.S. troops with their energy, mobility, and firepower can successfully take the fight to the NLF [National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam]."[84] With this recommendation, Westmoreland was advocating an aggressive departure from America's defensive posture and the sidelining of the South Vietnamese. By ignoring ARVN units, the U.S. commitment became open-ended.[85] Westmoreland outlined a three-point plan to win the war:

"Phase 1. Commitment of U.S. (and other free world) forces necessary to halt the losing trend by the end of 1965.

Phase 2. U.S. and allied forces mount major offensive actions to seize the initiative to destroy guerrilla and organized enemy forces. This phase would be concluded when the enemy had been worn down, thrown on the defensive, and driven back from major populated areas.

Phase 3. If the enemy persisted, a period of twelve to eighteen months following Phase 2 would be required for the final destruction of enemy forces remaining in remote base areas."[86]

The plan was approved by Johnson and marked a profound departure from the previous administration's insistence that the government of South Vietnam was responsible for defeating the guerrillas. Westmoreland predicted victory by the end of 1967.[87] Johnson did not, however, communicate this change in strategy to the media. Instead he emphasized continuity.[88] The change in U.S. policy depended on matching the North Vietnamese and the NLF in a contest of attrition and morale. The opponents were locked in a cycle of escalation.[89] The idea that the government of South Vietnam could manage its own affairs was shelved.[89]

Soon the NLF began to engage in small-unit guerrilla warfare, which allowed them to control the pace of the fighting.[citation needed]

It is widely held that the average U.S. serviceman was nineteen years old, as evidenced by the casual reference in a pop song (19 by Paul Hardcastle); the figure is cited by Lt. Col. Dave Grossman ret. of the Killology Research Group in his 1995 book On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society (p. 265). However, it is disputed by the[90] Vietnam Helicopter Flight Crew Network Website, which claims the average age of MOS 11B personnel was 22. This compares with twenty-six years of age for those who participated in World War II. Soldiers served a one year tour of duty. The average age of the US Military men who died in Vietnam was 22.8 years old.[91] The one-year tour of duty deprived units of experienced leadership. As one observer noted "we were not in Vietnam for 10 years, but for one year 10 times."[92] As a result, training programs were shortened. Some NCO's were referred to as "Shake 'N' Bake" to highlight their accelerated training. Unlike soldiers in World War II and Korea, there were no secure rear areas in which to get rest and relaxation (R'n'R). American troops were vulnerable to attack everywhere they went.[citation needed]

South Vietnam was inundated with manufactured goods. As Stanley Karnow writes, "the main PX, located in the Saigon suburb of Cholon, was only slightly smaller than the New York Bloomingdale's …"[93] The American buildup transformed the economy and had a profound impact on South Vietnamese society. A huge surge in corruption was witnessed. The country was also flooded with civilian specialists from every conceivable field to advise the South Vietnamese government and improve its performance.[citation needed]

Washington encouraged its SEATO allies to contribute troops. Australia, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines[94] all agreed to send troops. Major allies, however, notably NATO nations, Canada and the United Kingdom, declined Washington's troop requests.[95] The U.S. and its allies mounted complex operations, such as operations Masher, Attleboro, Cedar Falls, and Junction City. However, the communist insurgents remained elusive and demonstrated great tactical flexibility.

Meanwhile, the political situation in South Vietnam began to stabilize somewhat with the coming to power of Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky and President Nguyen Van Thieu in 1967. Thieu, mistrustful and indecisive, remained president until 1975.[96] This ended a long series of military juntas that had begun with Diem's assassination. The relative calm allowed the ARVN to collaborate more effectively with its allies and become a better fighting force.

The Johnson administration employed a "policy of minimum candor"[97] in its dealings with the media. Military information officers sought to manage media coverage by emphasizing stories which portrayed progress in the war. Over time, this policy damaged the public trust in official pronouncements. As the media's coverage of the war and that of the Pentagon diverged, a so-called credibility gap developed.[97]

In October 1967 a large anti-war demonstration was held on the steps of the Pentagon. Some protesters were heard to chant, "Hey, hey, LBJ! How many kids did you kill today?" One reason for the increase in the opposition to the Vietnam War was larger draft quotas.[citation needed]


Tet Offensive
Main article: Tet Offensive
Having lured General Westmoreland's forces into the hinterland at Khe Sanh in Quang Tri Province,[98] in January 1968, the PVA and NLF broke the truce that had traditionally accompanied the Tet (Lunar New Year) holiday. They launched the surprise Tet Offensive in the hope of sparking a national uprising. Over 100 cities were attacked, with assaults on General Westmoreland's headquarters and the U.S. embassy in Saigon.

Although the U.S. and South Vietnamese were initially taken aback by the scale of the urban offensive, they responded quickly and effectively, decimating the ranks of the NLF. In the former capital city of Hue, the combined NLF and NVA troops captured the Imperial Citadel and much of the city, which led to the Battle of Hue. During the interim between the capture of the Citadel and end of the "Battle of Hue", the communist insurgent occupying forces massacred several thousand unarmed Hue civilians (estimates vary up to a high of 6000). After the war, North Vietnamese officials acknowledged that the Tet Offensive had, indeed, caused grave damage to NLF forces. But the offensive had another, unintended consequence.

General Westmoreland had become the public face of the war. He was featured on the cover of Time magazine three times and was named 1965's Man of the Year.[99] Time described him as "the sinewy personification of the American fighting man … (who) directed the historic buildup, drew up the battle plans, and infused the … men under him with his own idealistic view of U.S. aims and responsibilities."[99]

In November 1967 Westmoreland spearheaded a public relations drive for the Johnson administration to bolster flagging public support.[100] In a speech before the National Press Club he said that a point in the war had been reached "where the end comes into view."[101] Thus, the public was shocked and confused when Westmoreland's predictions were trumped by Tet.[100] The American media, which had been largely supportive of U.S. efforts, rounded on the Johnson administration for what had become an increasing credibility gap. Despite its military failure, the Tet Offensive became a political victory and ended the career of President Lyndon B. Johnson, who declined to run for re-election. Johnson's approval rating slumped from 48 to 36 percent.[100] As James Witz noted, Tet "contradicted the claims of progress … made by the Johnson administration and the military."[100] The Tet Offensive was the turning point in America's involvement in the Vietnam War. It had a profound impact on domestic support for the conflict. The offensive constituted an intelligence failure on the scale of Pearl Harbor.[102][103] Journalist Peter Arnett quoted an unnamed officer, saying of Ben Tre that "it became necessary to destroy the village in order to save it".[104] Westmoreland became Chief of Staff of the Army in March, just as all resistance was finally subdued. The move was technically a promotion. However, his position had become untenable because of the offensive and because his request for 200,000 additional troops had been leaked to the media. Westmoreland was succeeded by his deputy Creighton Abrams, a commander less inclined to public media pronouncements.

On May 10, 1968, despite low expectations, peace talks began between the U.S. and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Negotiations stagnated for five months, until Johnson gave orders to halt the bombing of North Vietnam. The Democratic candidate, Vice President Hubert Humphrey, was running against Republican former vice president Richard Nixon. Through an intermediary, Anna Chennault, Nixon advised Saigon to refuse to participate in the talks until after elections, claiming that he would give them a better deal once elected. Thieu obliged, leaving almost no progress made by the time Johnson left office.

As historian Robert Dallek writes, "Lyndon Johnson's escalation of the war in Vietnam divided Americans into warring camps … cost 30,000 American lives by the time he left office, (and) destroyed Johnson's presidency …"[105] His refusal to send more U.S. troops to Vietnam was Johnson's admission that the war was lost. As Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara noted, "the dangerous illusion of victory by the United States was therefore dead."[106]

Vietnamization, 1969–1973

During the 1968 presidential election, Richard M. Nixon promised "peace with honor". His plan was to build up the ARVN, so that they could take over the defense of South Vietnam (the Nixon Doctrine). The policy became known as "Vietnamization", a term criticized by Robert K. Brigham for implying that, to that date, only Americans had been dying in the conflict.[107] Vietnamization had much in common with the policies of the Kennedy administration. One important difference, however, remained. While Kennedy insisted that the South Vietnamese fight the war themselves, he attempted to limit the scope of the conflict. In pursuit of a withdrawal strategy, Richard Nixon was prepared to employ a variety of tactics, including widening the war.[citation needed]

Nixon also pursued negotiations. Theater commander Creighton Abrams shifted to smaller operations, aimed at NLF logistics, with better use of firepower and more cooperation with the ARVN. Nixon also began to pursue détente with the Soviet Union and rapprochement with the People's Republic of China. This policy helped to decrease global tensions. Détente led to nuclear arms reduction on the part of both superpowers. But Nixon was disappointed that the PRC and the Soviet Union continued to supply the North Vietnamese with aid. In September 1969, Ho Chi Minh died at age seventy-nine.[citation needed]

The anti-war movement was gaining strength in the United States. Nixon appealed to the "silent majority" of Americans to support the war. But revelations of the My Lai Massacre, in which U.S. forces went on a rampage and killed civilians, including women and children, provoked national and international outrage. The civilian cost of the war was again questioned when the U.S concluded operation Speedy Express with a claimed bodycount of 10,889 NLF (vietcong) guerillas with only 40 U.S losses; Kevin Buckley writing in Newsweek estimated that perhaps 5,000 of the Vietnamese dead were civilians.[citation needed]

Prince Norodom Sihanouk had proclaimed Cambodia neutral since 1955,[108] but the VPA and NLF used Cambodian soil as a base and Sihanouk tolerated their presence, because he wished to avoid being drawn into a wider regional conflict. Under pressure from Washington, however, he changed this policy in 1969. The VPA and the NLF were no longer welcome. President Nixon took the opportunity to launch a massive secret bombing campaign, called Operation Menu, against their sanctuaries along the border. This violated a long succession of pronouncements from Washington supporting Cambodian neutrality. Richard Nixon wrote to Prince Sihanouk in April 1969 assuring him that the United States respected "the sovereignty, neutrality and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Cambodia …"[109] Over 14 months, however, approximately 2,750,000 tons of bombs were dropped,[citation needed] more than the total dropped by the Allies in World War II. The bombing was hidden from the American public. In 1970, Prince Sihanouk was deposed by his pro-American prime minister Lon Nol. The country's borders were closed, and the U.S. and ARVN launched incursions into Cambodia to attack VPA/NLF bases and buy time for South Vietnam. The coup against Sihanouk and U.S. bombing destabilized Cambodia and increased support for the Khmer Rouge.

The invasion of Cambodia sparked nationwide U.S. protests. Four students were killed by National Guardsmen at Kent State University during a protest in Ohio, which provoked public outrage in the United States. The reaction to the incident by the Nixon administration was seen as callous and indifferent, providing additional impetus for the anti-war movement.[110]

In 1971 the Pentagon Papers were leaked to The New York Times. The top-secret history of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, commissioned by the Department of Defense, detailed a long series of public deceptions. The Supreme Court ruled that its publication was legal.[111]

The ARVN launched Operation Lam Son 719, aimed at cutting the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos. The offensive was a clear violation of Laotian neutrality,[112] which neither side respected in any event. Laos had long been the scene of a Secret War. After meeting resistance, ARVN forces retreated in a confused rout. They fled along roads littered with their own dead. When they ran out of fuel, soldiers abandoned their vehicles and attempted to barge their way on to American helicopters sent to evacuate the wounded. Many ARVN soldiers clung to helicopter skids in a desperate attempt to save themselves. U.S. aircraft had to destroy abandoned equipment, including tanks, to prevent them from falling into enemy hands. Half of the invading ARVN troops were either captured or killed. The operation was a fiasco and represented a clear failure of Vietnamization. As Karnow noted "the blunders were monumental … The (South Vietnamese) government's top officers had been tutored by the Americans for ten or fifteen years, many at training schools in the United States, yet they had learned little."[113]

In 1971 Australia and New Zealand withdrew their soldiers. The U.S. troop count was further reduced to 196,700, with a deadline to remove another 45,000 troops by February 1972. As peace protests spread across the United States, disillusionment grew in the ranks. Drug use increased, race relations grew tense and the number of soldiers disobeying officers rose. Fragging, or the murder of unpopular officers with fragmentation grenades, increased.
Vietnamization was again tested by the Easter Offensive of 1972, a massive conventional invasion of South Vietnam. The VPA and NLF quickly overran the northern provinces and in coordination with other forces attacked from Cambodia, threatening to cut the country in half. U.S. troop withdrawals continued. But American airpower came to the rescue with Operation Linebacker, and the offensive was halted. However, it became clear that without American airpower South Vietnam could not survive. The last remaining American ground troops were withdrawn in August. But a force of civilian and military advisers remained in place.[citation needed]

The war was the central issue of the 1972 presidential election. Nixon's opponent, George McGovern, campaigned on a platform of withdrawal from Vietnam. Nixon's National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger, continued secret negotiations with North Vietnam's Le Duc Tho. In October 1972, they reached an agreement. However, South Vietnamese President Thieu demanded massive changes to the peace accord. When North Vietnam went public with the agreement's details, the Nixon administration claimed that the North was attempting to embarrass the President. The negotiations became deadlocked. Hanoi demanded new changes. To show his support for South Vietnam and force Hanoi back to the negotiating table, Nixon ordered Operation Linebacker II, a massive bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong. The offensive destroyed much of the remaining economic and industrial capacity of North Vietnam. Simultaneously Nixon pressured Thieu to accept the terms of the agreement, threatening to conclude a bilateral peace deal and cut off American aid. Popularly known as the Christmas Bombings, Operation Linebacker II provoked a fresh wave of anti-war demonstrations.[citation needed]

On January 15, 1973, Nixon announced the suspension of offensive action against North Vietnam. The Paris Peace Accords on "Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam" were signed on January 27, 1973, officially ending direct U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. A cease-fire was declared across North and South Vietnam. U.S. POWs were released. The agreement guaranteed the territorial integrity of Vietnam and, like the Geneva Conference of 1954, called for national elections in the North and South. The Paris Peace Accords stipulated a sixty-day period for the total withdrawal of U.S. forces. "This article," noted Peter Church, "proved … to be the only one of the Paris Agreements which was fully carried out."[114]

Exit of the Americans: withdrawal of American support for South Vietnam, 1973-1975

The U.S. and other allied forces began drastically reducing threir troop support in South Vietnam during the final years of "Vietnamization". Many U.S. troops were removed from the region, and on March 5, 1971, the U.S. returned the 5th Special Forces Group, which was the first American unit deployed to South Vietnam, to it's former base in Fort Bragg, North Carolina.[115]

Under Paris Peace Accord, between North Vietnamese Foreign Minister Lê Ðức Thọ and U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and reluctantly signed by South Vietnamese President Thiệu, U.S. military forces withdrew from South Vietnam and prisoners were exchanged. North Vietnam was allowed to continue supplying communist troops in the South, but only to the extent of replacing materials that were consumed. Later that year the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Kissinger and Thọ, but the Vietnamese negotiator declined it saying that a true peace did not yet exist.

The communist leaders had expected that the ceasefire terms would favor their side. But Saigon, bolstered by a surge of U.S. aid received just before the ceasefire went into effect, began to roll back the Vietcong.[116] The communists responded with a new strategy hammered out in a series of meetings in Hanoi in March 1973, according to the memoirs of Trần Văn Trà.[116] As the Vietcong's top commander, Trà participated in several of these meetings.[116] With U.S. bombings suspended, work on the Hochiminh Trail and other logistical structures could proceed unimpeded.[116] Logistics would be upgraded until the North was in a position to launch a massive invasion of the South, projected for the 1975-76 dry season.[116] Trà calculated that this date would be the Hanoi's last opportunity to strike before Saigon's army could be fully trained. A three-thousand-mile long oil pipeline would be built from North Vietnam to Vietcong headquarters in Loc Ninh, about 75 miles (121 km) northwest of Saigon.[116]

Although McGovern himself was not elected U.S. president, the November 1972 election did return a Democratic majority to both houses of Congress under McGovern's "Come home America" campaign theme. On March 15, 1973, U.S. President Richard Nixon implied that the U.S. would intervene militarily if the communist side violated the ceasefire.[117] Public and congressional reaction to Nixon's trial balloon was unfavorable and in April Nixon appointed Graham Martin as U.S. ambassador to Vietnam. Martin was a second stringer compared to previous U.S. ambassadors and his appointment was an early signal that Washington had given up on Vietnam.[117] During his confirmation hearings in June 1973, Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger stated that he would recommend resumption of U.S. bombing in North Vietnam if North Vietnam launched a major offensive against South Vietnam. On June 4, 1973, the U.S. Senate passed the Case-Church Amendment to prohibit such intervention.[117]

The oil price shock of October 1973 caused significant damage to the South Vietnamese economy. The Vietcong resumed offensive operations when dry season began and by January 1974 it had recaptured the territory it lost during the previous dry season. After two clashes that left 55 South Vietnamese soldiers dead, President Thiệu announced on January 4 that the war had restarted and that the Paris Peace Accord was no longer in effect. There had been over 25,000 South Vietnamese casualties during the ceasefire period.[118]

Gerald Ford took over as U.S. president on August 9, 1974 after President Nixon resigned due to the Watergate scandal. At this time, Congress cut financial aid to South Vietnam from $1 billion a year to $700 million. The U.S. midterm elections in 1974 brought in a new Congress dominated by Democrats who were even more determined to confront the president on the war. Congress immediately voted in restrictions on funding and military activities to be phased in through 1975 and to culminate in a total cutoff of funding in 1976.

The success of the 1973-74 dry season offensive inspired Trà to return to Hanoi in October 1974 and plead for a larger offensive in the next dry season. This time, Trà could travel on a drivable highway with regular fueling stops, a vast change from the days was Hochiminh Trail was a dangerous mountain trek.[119] Giáp, the North Vietnamese defense minister, was reluctant to approved Trà's plan. A larger offensive might provoke a U.S. reaction and interfere with the big push planned for 1976. Trà appealed over Giáp's head to party boss Lê Duẩn, who obtained Politburo approval for the operation.

Hans Morgenthau

Hans Joachim Morgenthau (February 17, 1904 – July 19, 1980) was a pioneer in the field of international relations theory. He was born in Coburg, Germany, and educated at the universities of Berlin, Frankfurt and Munich. He taught and practiced law in Frankfurt before fleeing to the United States in 1937 as the Nazis came to power in Germany. His experiences with Nazism seem to have influenced his later work in international relations theory, where he argued passionately in favor of a more scientific approach to politics, in contrast with the way the Nazi party came to imbue political science with a nationalist streak.

Morgenthau became professor at the University of Chicago. Along with E.H. Carr, he is one of the main authors of the realist school in the 20th century. This school of thought holds that nation-states are the main actors in international relations, and that the main concern of the field is the study of power.

His book Politics Among Nations defined the field of international relations theory in 1948 as it heralded the post–World War II paradigm shift in American thinking about diplomacy. Politics Among Nations emphasized the power interests of states as the driver behind the relations between states. The period before WWII was on the other hand defined by idealism that focused on values.

International relations

International relations is a branch of political science. It represents the study of foreign affairs and global issues among states within the international system, including the roles of states, inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and multinational corporations (MNCs). It is both an academic and public policy field, and can be either positive or normative as it both seeks to analyze as well as formulate the foreign policy of particular states.

Apart from political science, IR draws upon such diverse fields as economics, history, law, philosophy, geography, sociology, anthropology, psychology, and cultural studies. It involves a diverse range of issues, from globalization and its impacts on societies and state sovereignty to ecological sustainability, nuclear proliferation, nationalism, economic development, terrorism, organized crime, human security, and human rights.

The history of international relations is often traced back to the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, where the modern state system was developed. Prior to this, the European medieval organization of political authority was based on a vaguely hierarchical religious order. Westphalia instituted the legal concept of sovereignty, which essentially meant that rulers, or the legitimate sovereigns, would recognize no internal equals within a defined territory and no external superiors as the ultimate authority within the territory's sovereign borders. Classical Greek and Roman authority at times resembled the Westphalian system, but both lacked the notion of sovereignty.

Westphalia encouraged the rise of the independent nation-state, the institutionalization of diplomacy and armies. This particular European system was exported to the Americas, Africa, and Asia via colonialism and the "standards of civilization". The contemporary international system was finally established through decolonization during the Cold War. However, this is somewhat over-simplified. While the nation-state system is considered "modern", many states have not incorporated the system and are termed "pre-modern". Further, a handful of states have moved beyond the nation-state system and can be considered "post-modern". The ability of contemporary IR discourse to explain the relations of these different types of states is disputed. "Levels of analysis" is a way of looking at the international system, which includes the individual level, the domestic nation-state as a unit, the international level of transnational and intergovernmental affairs, and the global level.

What is explicitly recognized as International Relations theory was not developed until after World War I, and is dealt with in more detail below. IR theory, however, has a long tradition of drawing on the work of other social sciences. The use of capitalizations of the 'I' and 'R' in International Relations aims to distinguish the academic discipline of International Relations from the phenomena of international relations. Many cite Thucydides' "History of the Peloponnesian War" as the inspiration for realist theory, with Hobbes' "Leviathan" and Machiavelli's "The Prince" providing further elaboration. Similarly, liberalism draws upon the work of Kant and Rousseau, with the work of the former often being cited as the first elaboration of Democratic Peace Theory. Though contemporary human rights is considerably different than the type of rights envisioned under natural law, Francisco de Vitoria, Hugo Grotius and John Locke offered the first accounts of universal entitlement to certain rights on the basis of common humanity. In the twentieth century, in addition to contemporary theories of liberal internationalism, Marxism has been a foundation of international relations.


[edit] The study of IR
Initially, international relations as a distinct field of study was almost entirely British-centered. In 1919, the Chair in International Politics established at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth (renamed Aberystwyth University in 2008), from an endowment given by David Davies, became the first academic position dedicated to IR. In the early 1920s, the London School of Economics' department of International Relations was founded at the behest of Nobel Peace Prize winner Philip Noel-Baker. In 1927 the first university institution entirely dedicated to the study of IR, the Graduate Institute of International Studies (Institut universitaire de hautes), and offered one of the first Ph.D. degrees in international relations in the country. It is a charter member of the Association of Professional Schools of International Affairs (APSIA), which now has over twenty members. Several USC faculty members have served as president of APSIA over the years. The Committee on International Relations at the University of Chicago is the nation's oldest graduate program in international relations, founded in 1928. Other schools include the School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA) at Columbia University, School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University, Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, the School of International Relations at the University of St Andrews, and the Fletcher School at Tufts. While schools dedicated to the study of IR have been founded in Asia and South America, IR as a discipline of study remains centered chiefly in the West.